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5.1  Introduction 
After two decades of rapid economic growth characterized by heavy regula- 
tory intervention in the allocation of financial and physical resources, the Ko- 
rean government in the early 1980s began to realize the limits of active govern- 
ment  intervention and  to  introduce private  sector  initiatives in  economic 
management. The active role of  the private sector became inevitable for fur- 
ther, sustained economic development. 
Government intervention in the 1970s culminated in the policy to promote 
heavy  and chemical industry (HCI) by  channeling almost all available re- 
sources into this sector. As a part of the HCI policy, the Korean financial sector 
was treated only as a means of allocating available financial resources to the 
priority sector. Toward the end of  the 1970s, the Korean economy began to 
show structural weaknesses on many fronts: high inflation, real appreciation of 
the won, chronic balance of payments deficits, signs of  overinvestment in the 
HCIs, and the dominance of  large business groups over small- and medium- 
size enterprises (SMEs) due to the HCI drive. The second oil price shock fur- 
ther aggravated Korea’s worsening economic situation. 
Against this background, the government decided to reduce the degree of its 
intervention in the economy and launched a comprehensive program of  eco- 
nomic liberalization and opening in the early 1980s. As a part of this reform 
plan, financial liberalization and internationalization policies were adopted to 
invite competition into the domestic financial sector and to improve its effi- 
ciency. 
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Since the early  1980s, the Korean government has tried to relax various 
controls on capital flows gradually and slowly, so as not to disturb the domestic 
equilibrium. The controls on inflows and outflows have depended on the bal- 
ance of  payments and debt situation and exchange rate movement and have 
been given emphasis alternately, consistent with domestic macroeconomic pol- 
icies. At times, the short-run considerations of macroeconomic management 
have  dominated consideration of  the long-run benefits of  free capital flows, 
making it appear that the process of liberalization had been reversed. 
Recently, there have been many international as well as domestic discussions 
on the necessity of capital flow liberalization in Korea. Domestically, a consen- 
sus on the need for liberalizing capital flow seems to have been reached, not 
only to realize the potential gains from the free flow of  capital but also to 
prepare for the Uruguay Round negotiation, to join the OECD in the near fu- 
ture, and to meet the pressure from the United States for further market open- 
ing. However, the speed of  liberalization is still the subject of  lively discus- 
sions. Domestic policymakers seem to favor a gradual financial liberalization 
approach once domestic markets are liberalized. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of Korea’s experience 
of capital control and decontrol since the early 1980s and to quantify the extent 
of  Korea’s  capital mobility vis-8-vis that of Japan and Taiwan. The paper is 
structured as follows: In  section 5.2, the pattern of  Korea’s capital account 
controls will be described, and in section 5.3 the impediments to capital ac- 
count liberalization will be outlined. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 are meant to be a 
broad overview of  Korea’s capital flows and related policies as a preliminary 
discussion for the in-depth analysis in section 5.4. Section 5.4 will analyze and 
evaluate the extent of  Korea’s capital account openness, in comparison with 
Taiwan and Japan, utilizing various measures and techniques. Section 5.5 will 
conclude the paper with some observations. 
5.2  Pattern of Korea’s Capital Control 
5.2.1  Development of Korea’s Capital Account 
The structure of Korea’s capital account is illustrated in table 5.1. Concern- 
ing the long-term capital transaction on the liability side, public borrowing was 
the major source of  capital inflow in the first half  of  the  1980s, but in  the 
second half, it switched to become the major source of outflow. The same trend 
can be observed in commercial borrowings. This trend seems to reflect the 
stance of capital control policy, which encouraged an inflow during the current 
account deficit of the former period and an outflow during the current account 
surplus of the latter period, as will be discussed in the next section. 
The role of  foreign direct investment (FDI) in Korea increased gradually 
over the same period and is expected to play a bigger role in the future as 
further deregulations on FDI are forthcoming. Its role as a source of inflow, 125  Capital Mobility in Korea since the Early 1980s 
Short-term lending of development institution 
Short-term lending of merchant banking 
Table 5.1  Accounts of Korea’s Capital ’Ikansactions (a) 
Transactions  1981  1985  1987  1991 






Long-term trade credits 
Bank loans by development institutions 
Long-term foreign currency borrowings by 
Merchant banking corporation’s borrowing 
Foreign military sales loans 
Long-term foreign currency bills sold 
Import by lease under the condition of 






Medium- and long-term trade credits 
Subscriptions to international institutions 
Long-term imports prepayments 
Long-term lending of development 
institutions and merchant banking 
corporations 
Short-term capital transactions 
Liabilities 
Short-term trade credit 
Borrowings of crude oil import funds 
Advances under red-clause L/C 
Exports on simple remittance basis 
Domestic import usance sold 
Short-term foreign currency bill sold 
Short-term foreign currency borrowings by 
foreign exchange act 
Short-term borrowings of development 
institutions and merchant banking 
corporations 
Assets 
Short-term export credits 
Short-term imports prepayments 
Short-term private foreign currency deposit 
100  100  -100  100 
48.7  12.1  -25.3  -10.6 
9.0  -6.2  -18.8  -10.1 
3.6  8.8  10.9  20.9 
2.1  37.1  -2.1  55.4 
-0.4  -2.4  0.8  12.2 
37.8  36.2  -64.4  17.9 
-0.8  14.4  -1.2  14.4 
100  -100  -100  -100 
0  0  0  -0.4 
-182.3  -2.2  -57.4  -89.1 
0  0  0  -2.5 
404.3  -60.9  130.8  54.8 
-84.4  -1.3  -8.9  -1.4 
-37.6  -35.6  -164.4  -61.3 
-100  -100  -100  100 
18.6  -61.5  -401.5  -19.3 
4.6  -34.4  -92.6  -22.8 
-123.2  -4.1  394.1  142.1 
100  -100  -100  -100 
90.7  -99.3  -300  -  18.8 
9.3  -0.7  200  -81.2 
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Balance of Payments (Seoul, various issues). 
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especially, increased in the second half of  the 1980s. Opposite to this trend, 
the reliance on development institutions for bank loans declined and will be 
further reduced in the future, while portfolio investment, which has been an- 
other source of capital inflow, is expected to continue its rising trend into the 
next decade. Portfolio investment will become increasingly more important 
as the opening of  the Korean stock market in January 1992 begins to take 
full effect. 
On  the asset side, direct overseas investment has been  a major source of 
capital outflow and is currently on a rising trend. It reached 89.1 percent of the 
total net accumulation in 1991, and further increase is expected as Korea re- 
gains its current account balance. Therefore, it will continue to serve as a major 
source of  outflow. However, overseas portfolio investments, which had been 
almost zero, have begun appearing in recent years. They too are expected to 
increase as capital flow  liberalization proceeds. The repayment receipts of 
long- and medium-term trade credit has been a source of capital inflow. The 
long-term lending of development institutions will rise as Korea increases its 
efforts to supply funds to developing countries. 
Concerning short-term capital transactions, short-term trade credit, which 
was once an important source of import financing, is now a major capital out- 
flow item. In recent years, Korea has been repaying short-term trade credits. 
On the asset side, Korea has been providing substantial short-term credit to 
importers of Korean products. 
5.2.2  Patterns of Korea’s Capital Control 
According to an OECD research paper (OECD 1990), the patterns of capital 
control for all OECD countries in the past 25 years were influenced by  the 
balance of payments situation, exchange rate movements, and the development 
of monetary management. When countries experienced balance of  payments 
deficits, they tended to rely on restrictions on capital outflow. Also, in the case 
of  monetary management, capital inflows were restricted if  they were per- 
ceived as making monetary management difficult. Depending on the behavior 
of these three factors, capital controls were sometimes placed on inflow and at 
other times on outflow. 
The Korean case follows this example. During the 1980s, the pattern of capi- 
tal control was determined by a consideration of the balance of payments, ex- 
change rate, and monetary management. In the early 1980s, Korea faced bal- 
ance of  payments  and  foreign debt problems  and,  thus, restricted  capital 
outflows. In the latter half of the 1980s, when it recorded current account sur- 
pluses, Korea had difficulty controlling the monetary aggregate. There were 
also very strong pressures for capital inflow to appreciate the exchange rate, 
which in turn would have adversely affected export competitiveness.  Thus, Ko- 
rea placed strong restrictions on capital inflow. 
Policies dealing with decontrol of  the capital account were strongly influ- 
enced by  Korea’s macroeconomic situation, especially by the current account 127  Capital Mobility in Korea since the Early 1980s 
and debt situation in the first half of the 1980s and by the concern over mone- 
tary controls and exchange rate movements in the latter half. In the early 1980s, 
the government was strictly concerned about accumulating foreign debt and 
increasing current account deficits, and therefore restricted capital outflow but 
encouraged capital inflow. On the other hand, in the second half of the decade, 
the government was concerned about controlling liquidity and avoiding ex- 
change rate appreciation and so restricted capital inflow but encourage capital 
outflow. 
The following section will discuss and evaluate the pattern of Korea’s capital 
control, dividing the 1980s into the two periods of the early and late 1980s. 
Early 1980s: Outjiow Controlled and Infow Encouraged 
The early 1980s witnessed chronic current account deficits, capital account 
surpluses, and a continued depreciation of the Korean won (see table 5.2). The 
international debt crisis disproportionately affected Korea, which had accumu- 
lated a large foreign debt (see table 5.3). This foreign debt continued to in- 
crease at a rapid pace, reaching its peak, almost 40 percent of GNP, in  1985. 
However, while the real interest rate differential was favorable to Korea for the 
period 1981-85,  the uncovered interest rate differential was negative on aver- 
age (see fig. 5.1). Even when the real interest rate was higher, no real incentives 
existed for foreign capital to come to Korea, because of exchange rate expecta- 
tions. Despite this, Korea witnessed a large capital inflow during this period, 
because it had placed very strong regulations on capital outflow, thus leading 
to the eventual net capital inflow. 
Korea has been a net capital importer ever since its economic development 
process began. The country has relied mainly on foreign borrowing rather than 
on foreign direct or portfolio investment as a method of financing. During the 
first half of the 1980s, public borrowing financed more than 50 percent of the 
total capital account surplus on average. In addition, however, foreign direct 
investment was also given a fair amount of emphasis as a financing source. In 
July  1984, the regulators of foreign direct investment adopted a negative list 
system, which greatly helped activate direct investment by nonresidents. (See 
app. B for changes in capital flow regulation). 
However, the policy mix during this period was very inconsistent. If Korea 
had really wanted to induce a large capital inflow, the domestic interest rate 
should have been maintained at a higher level. At the time, the uncovered inter- 
est rate parity was unfavorable to Korea. Although the real interest rate was 
positive, it was smaller than in the latter part of the 1980s. This pattern of real 
interest rate and uncovered interest rate differentials did not fully match the 
Korean government’s intention to control capital at that time. 
Lute 1980s: Infow Controlled and Outjlow Decontrolled 
From  1986 to  1989, Korea enjoyed the so-called three lows: low interna- 
tional interest rates, low oil prices, and low dollar and won exchange rates vis- Table 5.2  Korea's Capital Account and Other Economic Indicators 
Average 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1981-85 
Current account balance (million $) 
Capital account balance 
Long-term capital balance 
(% of GNP) 








Woddollar exchange rate 
(rate of depreciation; %) 
Real effective exchange rateb 
(rate of depreciation; %) 
Yield to corporate bonds (%) 
Inflation in GNP deflator (%) 
Real interest rate differentials (%y 
Uncovered interest rate differentials (%)d 
Capital flows as a percentage of trade (%y 
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10.11 Portfolio investment 
Foreign direct investment 
M, (averages; billion won) 
Change (%) 
MSBs issued (billion won) 
Net foreign assets (billion won) 
Real GNP growth rate (%) 
(% of M,) 












13,7  14.80 
27.40 
1,660.40 














































-  5,095.46 
(-25.08) 
8.40 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Average 
1986-90  1991 
Current account balance (million $) 
Capital account balance 
Long-term capital balance 
(% of GNF') 








Won/dollar exchange rate 
(rate of  depreciation; %) 
Real effective exchange rateb 






-  1,981.90 
-336.20 
-  126.30 
94.40 













-  1,397.00 





















-  207.80 









-  1,958.00 
-  1,067.30 
-824.70 








- 2,179.40  6,30 1.36 
3,881.20  -  1,806.86 
(-0.9) 
(1.60) 
547.50  -2,673.10 
1,311.40  -1,770.94 
-816.60  -907.32 
-764.60  -740.12 
-763.90  -902.16 
3,333.70  866.24 
3,665.40  1,042.70 
-331.70  -176.46 
707.80  762.98 
(5.40)  (-3.84) 
93.80  98.82 
(4.70)  (0.66) 
-8,827.2 














(1.49) Table 5.2  (continued) 
Average 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1981-85 
Yield to corporate bonds (%)  12.80  12.80  14.50  15.20  16.40  14.34  18.8 
Inflation in GNP deflator (%)  2.83  3.38  5.85  5.12  10.68  5.58  11.23 
Uncovered interest rate differentials (%)d  8.37  12.98  20.12  9.24  1.94  10.73  7.66 
Capital flows as a percentage of trade (%y 
Real interest rate differentials (%y  5.08  6.25  3.46  5.08  4.93  4.95  7.39 
Overall capital account  6.40  13.01  12.58  4.86  6.82  8.73  - 
Portfolio investment  0.47  0.13  0.45  0.07  0.77  0.38  - 
Foreign direct investment  0.86  0.92  0.95  0.90  1.20  0.97  - 
M, (averages; billion won)  30,396.20  36,119.60  42,893.00  50,793.10  61,576.10  44,355.60  73,024.0 
Change (%)  16.80  18.80  18.80  18.40  21.20  18.80  18.6 
MSBs issued (billion won)  4,285.20  9,006.70  16,297.20  18,003.10  15,611.50  12,640.74  13,862.3 
(% of M,)  (14.10)  (24.94)  (38.00)  (35.44)  (25.35)  (28.50)  (3 1.25) 
Net foreign assets (billion won)  -6,127.70  -1,605.10  7,251.20  9,104.00  10,139.70  3,752.42  8,075.8 
(% of M,)  (-20.16)  (-4.44)  (16.91)  (17.92)  (16.47)  (8.46)  (1  1.06) 
Real GNP growth rate (%)  12.90  13.00  12.40  6.80  9.30  10.88  8.4 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics  (Washington, D.C.); IMF, Balance of  Payments Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.);  Korea Develop- 
ment Institute database (Seoul). 
”Negative  entry records increase. 
bCalculated based on a trade-weighted currency basket of Korea’s seven major trading partners (United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, 
the Netherlands, Canada) deflated by the wholesale price indices. The base period is 1985:3-86:2.  The data is period average. 
‘Real yield to corporate bond minus real LIBOR-on-dollar deposit (deflator: GNP deflator). 
dDomestic yield to corporate bond minus LIBOR-on-dollar deposit minus actual won depreciation rate. 
‘([outflow1 + linflow()/(lexportl  + limportl). Table 5.3  Outstanding Foreign Debt and Assets (million $) 
November 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Total  foreign debt 
Long-term debt 








Net foreign debt 
Total foreign debt/ 
Foreign asset/GNP 


































































































44,510  35,568 
(-2,252)  (8,942) 
33,568  24,884 
(-291)  (-8,684) 
1,686  1,393 
(-485)  (-293) 
9,256  9,29 1 
(- 1,476)  (35) 
12,008  13,155 
(786)  (1,147) 
3,381  2,915 
8,627  10,240 
(244)  (1,613) 
32,502  22,413 
(542)  (-466) 
(-3,038)  (-10,089) 
43.3  27.6 
11.7  10.2 













































































Source: Ministry of Finance (Seoul). 
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Fig. 5.1  Korea’s uncovered interest rate differentials 
i-vis the yen. Given this environment and the successful stabilization plan in 
the first half of the 1980s, Korea was in a position to take full advantage of 
these conditions. Starting in the latter half of  1986, Korea started recording 
current account surpluses. 
The Korean government then became concerned about the effectiveness of 
its  monetary policy because the current account surplus had  automatically 
brought more liquidity to the economy. With this increased liquidity in the 
economy, Korea had to sterilize the current account surplus, which peaked at 
8.2 percent of GNP in 1988. 
Historically, Korea had relied heavily on direct monetary control, instead of 
indirect monetary management, because the interest rate had been regulated 
and the short-term money market had not been well developed. Given these 
structural problems, Korea was  not in a position to utilize maximally open 
market operations. The Korean government issued large stocks of  monetary 
stabilization bonds (MSBs) to sterilize the current account surplus. Instead of 
selling in the open market at the free market rate, the government allocated 
certain amounts of MSBs to banks and other nonfinancial institutions. Espe- 
cially during 1986-89,  a huge stock of MSBs was accumulated. 
A second concern for the government was the real possibility of further ap- 
preciation of the won due to capital inflow in addition to the current account 
surplus. Strong sentiment existed to continue the current account surpluses, 
which were the first in Korean history, to resolve the foreign debt problem. To 
maintain export competitiveness, the Korean won had to remain at a relatively 
competitive  level.  Moreover,  during  this  period,  international  pressure 
mounted to liberalize imports. This also required a competitive exchange rate 133  Capital Mobility in Korea since the Early 1980s 
to compensate for the adverse impact of import liberalization on the current 
account. In general, capital account liberalization could be expected to lead to 
the inflow of capital and the appreciation of the won, given the relatively high 
Korean interest rates compared with the international rate. The stronger won 
vis-a-vis other major currencies would have weakened the competitiveness of 
exports, the driving engine behind Korea’s economic growth. This, from the 
government’s viewpoint, has been the main counterargument against the liber- 
alization of the capital account, especially capital inflow. The appreciation of 
the won has been one of the biggest concerns of the Korean government. 
Given the economic situation in the early  1980s,  the government pushed 
very strongly for a policy oriented toward capital outflow during the second 
half of the 1980s. Regulations governing capital flows were reversed from the 
early 1980s, during which the Korean government had actively sought to keep 
capital within the country. The regulations instead were changed to induce cap- 
ital outflow actively. The deregulations on capital flow during this period seem 
to have been concentrated on overseas direct and portfolio investments (see 
appendix B). The Korean government even allowed such transactions as real 
estate investments in foreign countries, which had been regarded as taboo for 
a long time. 
Analyzing the figures in table 5.2, we find large capital outflows during the 
1980s; the largest component was long-term capital outflow, including repay- 
ments of commercial as well as public borrowings and accumulation of foreign 
assets. However, Korea during this period enjoyed a very favorable interest rate 
differential, much higher than in the early 1980s. The uncovered interest rate 
differential was also very favorable to Korea, the opposite of the situation in the 
early 1980s. This interest rate situation provided strong incentives for capital 
inflow-at  a time when the government was actively trying to ship money 
abroad-and  was thus inconsistent with the government intention to encourage 
capital outflow. Probably as a reflection of this, short-term capital balance, con- 
trary to the case of long-term capital balance, recorded a large surplus led by 
a huge inflow, through an accumulation of short-term liabilities. 
Contrasts with Japan 
This pattern of capital control, which is especially conditional on exchange 
rate movements, is not confined to Korea. It is also interesting to observe that 
Japan’s experience with capital control during the 1970s closely follows this 
pattern. Fukao (1990, 136) concludes, after a lengthy overview of Japan’s pat- 
tern of  capital control during  1970s that, “foreign exchange controls in the 
period of the expected appreciation of the yen before mid-1973 worked toward 
suppressing capital inflows and encouraging capital outflows. But, once the 
oil crisis occurred, the controls turned 180 degrees toward suppressing cap- 
ital outflows and encouraging capital inflows. Another volte-face occurred 
once the yen began to strengthen suddenly in 1977 and 1978 and the direction 
turned once again toward suppressing capital inflows and encouraging out- 
flows.” 134  Sung Hee Jwa 
Ito (1  990, 3 17) also makes the same observation, noting that, “capital con- 
trols were relaxed in several steps during the 1970s. The history of deregula- 
tion coincides with the roller-coaster path of the yeddollar exchange rate. The 
Japanese monetary authority clearly had the objective of exchange-rate stabili- 
zation, so the restrictions on outflow (inflow) were lifted when the monetary 
authority desired to prevent rapid yen appreciation (depreciation).”  In addition, 
as already mentioned in the beginning of  this section, other OECD countries 
were observed to follow a similar pattern during the period of  capital flow 
liberalization (OECD 1990). 
It may be that the effect of government capital control, which works against 
the economic incentives, tends to be limited concerning private capital flows. 
The policies to encourage capital inflow against the unfavorable uncovered 
interest differential during the early  1980s and to encourage capital outflow 
against the favorable interest rate incentive during the late 1980s both turned 
out to be ineffective in influencing short-term capital movement in the intended 
direction. It is also interesting to observe the same phenomenon in Japanese 
capital control. Fukao (1990, 136) states, “these effects of  changing foreign 
exchange controls can be separated into defensive ones (suppressing capital 
inflows when the yen was high, and outflows when low) and active ones (such 
as encouraging capital outflows when the yen  was  high, and capital inflows 
when low). The defensive effects were perhaps effective to an  extent. . . .  How- 
ever, the active effects are likely to have  been limited. Although effective 
sometimes such as in the expansion of capital outflows in 1972-73, the active 
effects attempted to work contrary to economic incentives for capital flows on 
the whole.” 
Looking at the indicators of interest rate differentials and the importance of 
capital flow as percentage of total trade in table 5.2, one cannot easily establish 
any definitive trend for the 1980s. In 1980 the uncovered interest rate differen- 
tials exhibited negative values which imply unfavorable conditions for Korea. 
The value of the differential remained at a relatively low level until 1985, then 
turned positive in  1986. The differential recorded large positive values for 
1987-89  but has gradually declined since then. If one takes the absolute size 
of the uncovered interest rate differential as the measure of the degree of capi- 
tal control, it may be concluded that capital flow mobility in the second half of 
the 1980s was less than in the first half of the 1980s. However, capital flows as 
a percentage of trade, which could also be taken as a measure of the degree of 
capital movement, recorded a double digit ratio during the years 1987-88.  The 
years of high interest rate differentials tend to show a high degree of  capital 
movement. 
This rather contradictory observation reflects what seems to be an inconsis- 
tent capital control policy-policy  leaning against the wind-inducing  capital 
outflow under a favorable interest rate condition mainly by  repaying public 
borrowing, but being unsuccessful in reducing the interest rate differentials 
and, therefore, the pressure on the exchange rate. This case seems to imply that 135  Capital Mobility in Korea since the Early 1980s 
active controls (in this case, encouraging outflow when the won was high and 
the uncovered interest rate differential was favorable to Korea) were not only 
ineffective in accomplishing the intended goals, as suggested by  Fukao, but 
rather aggravated the existing real incentives by increasing interest rate differ- 
entials, causing private short-term flows in a direction opposite to policy inten- 
tion. Exporting capital through the early repayment of  public borrowing-in 
the presence of appreciation pressure on the won  and defensive controls on 
capital inflow-have  aggravated excess demand for the won, widened interest 
rate differentials, and produced further pressure for won appreciation, thereby 
generating further incentive for private short-term capital inflow. 
However, it is noteworthy that foreign direct investment led by  private in- 
vestment increased continuously as a percentage of trade during the  1980s, 
and portfolio investment followed suit, though a little less clearly. Therefore, 
it seems difficult to come to a conclusion on the trend of capital mobility in 
Korea by  analyzing only traditional indicators. In section 5.4, this issue will 
be addressed again with additional measurements and also some comparisons 
with Japan and Taiwan. 
5.3  Impediments to Capital Flow Decontrol in Korea 
It would be absurd to assume that capital decontrol can be carried out with- 
out any financial problems. However, such problems can be minimized by im- 
plementing the deregulation in an orderly fashion. As pointed out by the litera- 
ture on the sequencing of economic liberalization (Fischer and Reisen 1992; 
Hanson 1992), macroeconomic stability, interest rate deregulation, and flexible 
exchange rates are the crucial preconditions to a relatively crisis-free transition. 
Two different approaches to the liberalization of capital flow were observed 
among the OECD countries: the rapid and drastic (United Kingdom, Australia, 
and New Zealand) versus the gradual (Japan, Denmark, and Finland) approach 
(OECD 1990). Japan, especially, having taken the gradual approach that Korea 
is taking now,  is a possible model for countries newly seeking capital flow 
deregulation. Starting in 1964 when it joined the OECD, Japan removed its 
capital controls gradually until 1980. First, foreign direct investment, inward 
and outward securities investment, and personal capital movement began to be 
liberalized at the end of  1970. Then, the liberalization of real estate operations 
and overseas direct investment was initiated in 1971. Restrictions on securities 
transactions and commercial lending were removed during the period 1975- 
76. All remaining restrictions were finally lifted in 1980 with the introduction 
of the new Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (OECD 1990; 
Fukao 1990; Ito 1991; Fischer and Reisen 1992). 
Judging from the experiences of those forerunners, foreign direct investment 
and trade-related finance seem to be the first areas that could be  liberalized 
since their reform will probably not cause serious problems for the stability 
and management of the financial sector. Before continuing with liberalization, 136  Sung Hee Jwa 
however, it must be assumed that macroeconomic stabilization will bring down 
the sustained interest rate differentials, and this drop will probably generate 
“hot money” or capital flight after capital flow liberalization. Then, deregula- 
tion of the domestic interest rate, along with flexible exchange rates, ensures 
the development of the domestic money market and provides a buffer against 
hot money flow. Once domestic financial markets deepen and the opportunities 
for domestic portfolio investment are enlarged, control on capital outflows can 
be removed. 
Following these steps will help lead to interest rates that match international 
rates. With these mechanisms in place, controls on short-term borrowing for 
banks and nonbanks and restrictions on nonresident investment in the domestic 
securities market should be abolished, since the deepened money market en- 
ables the authorities to absorb liquidity shocks more effectively and more 
smoothly. 
In Korea, foreign direct investment and trade-related finance have already 
been mostly liberalized, as discussed in the previous section (see also table 5.1 
and app. B). However, it has been observed that Korea has been very slow in 
liberalizing the flow of  portfolio investment and also short-term capital flow. 
This slowness has been due mainly to concerns about possible disturbances 
caused by capital flow into the domestic economy induced by financial incen- 
tives. Especially in the early 1980s, the Korean government was worried about 
capital flight because of  the negative uncovered interest parity and other fac- 
tors, both economic and non-economic. However, in the late 1980s, given a 
regulated interest rate above the international level and an inflexible exchange 
rate subject to the old double-basket peg regime, rapid capital flow liberaliza- 
tion was thought to induce too large an inflow, which would have made manag- 
ing domestic monetary policies difficult. Of  course, as already mentioned, 
pressure for won appreciation itself was also one of  the government’s main 
concerns. 
Therefore, one could argue that the major impediments to capital flow de- 
control in Korea are interest rate regulation-which  prevents the domestic in- 
terest rate from moving consistently with the international rate-the  inflexible 
exchange rate regime based on a basket peg system, and the inefficient mone- 
tary control system-which  relies on a direct domestic credit control policy 
that significantly limits the economy’s ability to absorb the excess liquidity 
caused by capital inflow. 
5.3.1 
Before capital account liberalization can be smoothly executed, the domes- 
tic interest rate must be liberalized to absorb the shocks from capital flow. 
However, in Korea, interest rate deregulation has been extremely difficult, and 
this difficulty has proved a huge hurdle to capital account liberalization. 
The Korean government has defended its policy stance of  opposing quick 
interest rate deregulation for several reasons. It has contended that interest rate 
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deregulation will increase funding costs for firms. Korean business firms are 
characterized by huge debt to equity ratios, and any increase in the interest rate 
will greatly impact the financial costs of these firms. Second, domestic banks 
have been burdened by  a large portion of  nonperforming and policy loans. 
Interest rate deregulation and more competition in the financial market would 
put banks in a critically disadvantaged position vis-8-vis nonbank financial 
intermediaries and foreign banks. The banks, burdened with nonperforming 
loans, could not compete with other financial institutions that do not have to 
worry about these bad loans. Deposit rate deregulation in particular would seri- 
ously jeopardize the soundness of  the banking sector. Therefore, the amount 
of nonperfoming loans makes it extremely difficult to open the banking sector 
to market competition. Also, policy loans by  commercial banks, which are 
directed by the government, still account for almost half of domestic credit. 
These include loans to the housing and agricultural sectors, loans to small and 
medium-sized firms, and foreign currency loans mainly for capital goods im- 
ports. Until commercial banks are freed from the obligation of extending pol- 
icy loans, financial liberalization will be limited. 
However, those reasons tell only part of  the story. Concerning the problem 
of funding cost, businesses already pay the market rate because banks, in an 
effort to evade regulations, employ such techniques as the compensating bal- 
ance, which asks for a deposit for the loan that is given out, a sort of forced 
deposit. It has been generally accepted that only a small portion of businesses, 
mainly big businesses, enjoy access to regulated interest rates, while small and 
medium-sized firms are exposed to the market rate. Even those businesses that 
have access to regulated interest rate loans have been known to pay an effective 
rate near the market rate because of  schemes such as the compensating bal- 
ance. Therefore, the possibility of higher funding costs should not be a great 
barrier to interest rate deregulation. 
On the other hand, the concern has surfaced that the market interest rate 
itself will rise after interest rate deregulation, so that the industrial sector will 
be hard hit. However, it is difficult to find a solid and convincing theoretical 
basis for this argument. 
Also, the weight of nonperforming loans has been reduced recently, because 
the capital base of the banks has been increasing. The korean banking industry 
enjoys a deposit and lending rate spread that is very high in comparison to thi? 
in Japan or the United States. For all commercial banks in Korea, the spread 
was 4.53 percent in 1990 and 4.66 percent in 1991, while for Japan it was 1.21 
percent in 1989, and for the United States it was 2.38 percent in 1990. This 
large deposit and lending rate spread has allowed domestic Korean banks big- 
ger profit margins. 
The prolonged control of interest rates would result in a vicious circle of 
interest rate regulation and financial retardation. In spite of the widening gap 
between regulated and market interest rates in recent years, regulated rates 
have been adjusted minimally. Because the government hopes to see strong 138  Sung Hee Jwa 
corporate investment that would accelerate the structural adjustment of the Ko- 
rean industries, it has been reluctant to raise interest rates. The government’s 
desire to borrow cheaply when it issues public debentures must have also af- 
fected its interest rate policy. 
Therefore, the difficulties outlined by  the government do not seem to fully 
reflect the true nature of the issues at hand. Banks enjoy a large spread buffer, 
and businesses have already been paying an interest cost that is near the market 
rate. Therefore, in addition to some of these problems, there seems to be an- 
other, deep-rooted reason why a strong push for interest rate deregulation has 
not been achieved-the  political economy of interest rate reform. 
In  general, during a process of interest rate deregulation, there are always 
gainers and losers. In the Korean case, the business and banking sectors are 
likely to be the losers. The business sector, especially big businesses, will lose 
its privileged position of access to regulated interest rate loans. And the bank- 
ing sector will lose its monopolistic position protected by the government and 
the quiet business environment created by interest rate and financial regulation. 
The Korean banking sector has enjoyed an existence without competition and 
with high profit margins. Also, interest rate deregulation means that the gov- 
ernment or the Central Bank will lose control over the financial sector. If  the 
interdependent relationship between the regulators and the financial sector is 
scrutinized, it becomes apparent not only that the regulators are concerned 
about losing their regulatory power but that both are quietly enjoying a mutu- 
ally beneficial relationship. Moreover, although the major beneficiary of  the 
liberalization is the general public, according to the public choice theory, they 
are not in a position to effectively mobilize the resources needed to influence 
current government interest rate policy.  * 
For these reasons, it has been difficult to change the current regulatory envi- 
ronment. In 1988, the Korean government launched an ambitious interest rate 
deregulation. However, after only about six months, the government reversed 
its policy when the jumps in the previously regulated interest rate were politi- 
cally unacceptable. Interest deregulation was tried again for the second time in 
1991. The government has tended to back away from its stance when the busi- 
ness sector complains of the higher interest rates. In early 1992, the govern- 
ment intervened again, influencing the interest rate indirectly through moral 
suasion. The prospect for capital account deregulation in Korea still remains 
very glum, because without interest rate liberalization, capital account liberal- 
ization will remain too difficult for Korea to digest. Continued government 
intervention in interest rate determination will remain a major impediment. 
1. It has been shown that  the influence of  interest group politics on policymaking is clearly 
evident in  Korea’s import liberalization policy during the 1980s. See Jwa (1988). With political 
democratization after  1986, this force has been reinforced in every area of economic reform in- 
cluding interest rate deregulation. 139  Capital Mobility in Korea since the Early 1980s 
5.3.2  Exchange Rate Appreciation and an Inflexible Exchange Rate System 
Although a system of flexible exchange rates could generate high exchange 
rate volatility when taken together with the deregulated interest rate, it would 
be an important buffer against shocks from volatile capital flows and protect, 
to a large extent, domestic monetary independence. 
Korea, especially during the late 1980s, faced the two inconsistent tasks of 
liberalizing the exchange market and exchange rate systems and avoiding real 
exchange appreciation-all  in the midst of a very favorable interest rate parity. 
During this period, Korea had been pressed by the United States to liberalize 
its import regime and exchange rate system, but Korea also saw a strong need 
for maintaining its current account surpluses and, therefore, a competitive ex- 
change rate level. But at the same time, the won was subject to strong apprecia- 
tion pressure from market forces, because of the current account surplus and 
favorable interest rate differential, as well as from the U.S. government. How- 
ever, Korea’s exchange rate system during the 198Os, a double-basket system, 
turned out to be relatively rigid in managing these factors. After all, Korea 
allowed a gradual appreciation of  the won during this period but with strict 
regulations on capital inflow and encouragement of capital outflow. And finally 
in 1990, Korea adopted a market-average exchange rate system with the objec- 
tive of introducing a more flexible exchange rate system in the end. 
Korea’s exchange rate had been subject to the so-called double-basket sys- 
tem during the 1980s, in which the worddollar exchange rate was determined 
as a weighted average of two different nominal effective rates, based on Ko- 
rea’s own basket and the IMF currency basket, respectively. Under this system, 
ample room existed for the government to influence the exchange rate. But 
when the won began to appreciate vis-A-vis the U.S. dollar after 1987, because 
of the current account surplus, and was subject to strong appreciation pressure 
from capital inflow, the government could not effectively work against the mar- 
ket forces. U.S. pressure to appreciate the won also mounted during the second 
half of the 1980s. The Korean won appreciated at rates larger that 9 percent in 
real terms in 1989 and by as much as 11 percent in nominal terms in 1988 (see 
table 5.2). In the end, Korea adopted the market-average exchange rate system 
in March 1990, under which the worddollar exchange rate floats according to 
market forces within a given narrow band. The central rate under this new 
system is determined by  the quantity-weighted average exchange rate of  the 
previous market day. This is an improvement upon the old double-basket sys- 
tem and is being improved further by gradually widening the band (the band 
is now 20.8 percent, which was set in July 1992). 
In retrospect, concern over a possible exchange rate appreciation, especially 
during the late 1980s, turned out to be one of the main impediments to the 
liberalization of capital flow, especially capital inflow, but with the introduc- 
tion of a market-average exchange rate system, a more conducive environment 
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5.3.3  Monetary Control and the Lack of an Indirect Control Method 
The loss of monetary independence, especially the inflationary pressure that 
will be generated by free capital flow (as in the Korean case), has been a major 
source of concern for countries implementing capital account liberalization. 
Korea has suffered from chronic inflation except for a few years in the mid- 
1980s. To control inflation, the Korean government employs a direct monetary 
control method because Korea lacks the environment for market-based mone- 
tary management, such as open market operation. The inflow that would result 
from capital account liberalization may  easily lead to inflation, a source of 
concern for the government. Without effective means to manage the money 
supply, the Central Bank will experience difficulties in efforts to sterilize the 
large inflow of capital. An indirect monetary control system allows higher ef- 
ficiency in absorbing liquidity shocks brought by capital inflow, which would 
otherwise jeopardize domestic macroeconomic stability. So, unless Korea can 
develop an indirect management system, it will be difficult to allow large capi- 
tal inflow. 
Currently, Korea is trying to develop an efficient short-term money market 
by reducing limitations on the operational mechanism of the market and dereg- 
ulating short-term interest rates, thereby paving the way for efficient open mar- 
ket operation. However, as has already been discussed, the slow pace of inter- 
est  rate  deregulation will  hinder  rapid  financial deepening  in  the  money 
market. In particular, the reluctance of the government and the Central Bank 
to deregulate the interest rates of government and monetary stabilization bonds 
will continue to be a stumbling block to the introduction of an indirect mone- 
tary control mechanism and to further capital flow liberalization. 
5.4  The Extent of Capital Account Opening: Intercountry Comparison 
5.4.1  Capital Flow as a Percentage of Trade 
One of the indicators that measure the openness of the capital account is the 
volume of capital flow as a percentage of trade, measured as exports plus im- 
ports. If  a country, over time and in comparison with other countries, has an 
increasing and large volume of capital flow relative to trade volume, it may be 
stated that this country has increasingly and relatively mobile capital transac- 
tions (Gros 1992). Even if  a country, in appearance, has numerous regulatory 
measures against capital flows, the country may be regarded as having a rela- 
tively open capital account, depending on the size of the capital flow as a per- 
centage of trade. 
When overall capital flows are analyzed as shown in table 5.4 (data for Tai- 
wan were not available), the performance of Korea is poor in comparison with 
the total flows of Asian developing countries as well as with Japan. We  find 
the same result when we compare foreign direct investment and portfolio in- Table 5.4  Capital Flows as a Percentage of Trade (%; period average) 
Overall Capital Account  Portfolio Investment  Foreign Direct Investment  Other 


































5.76  9.80  7.78  3.23  7.29  5.26  15.18 
6.25  8.24  7.24  5.14  10.57  7.85  21.01 
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Source: IMF, Balance of  Payments Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.). 
"Includes 22 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
bIncludes 24 countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China (People's Republic), Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Korea, Laos (People's Democratic Republic), Malaysia, 
Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, and 
Asia not specified. 
'Includes an extraordinarily high number, 1.86 in 1985. Excluding this gives an average of 0.3 percent. 142  Sung  Hee Jwa 
vestment flows. During the  1980s, while the indices for overall capital and 
portfolio investment flows seem to suggest a downward trend of capital mobil- 
ity from the first to the second half  of  the  1980s, the numbers are slightly 
misleading because foreign direct investment in 1985 shows an extraordinarily 
high number, 1.86 percent, which seems to distort the overall picture (see also 
table 5.2).’ If  1985 is excluded, the trend for portfolio investment indicates a 
rise. On the other hand, the index for direct investment, even if still relatively 
low, suggests a rapidly rising trend of capital mobility. Therefore, it could be 
the case that the openness of Korea’s capital account increased gradually dur- 
ing the 1980s, though it is still very low if the size of the capital account as a 
percentage of the trade account is taken as a measure of capital mobility. 
For Japan, all the indices of capital flow (as a percentage of trade) during 
the 1980s show a rapidly rising trend over time. And, with the exception of the 
foreign direct investment index, Japan’s indices are higher than those of total 
flows for industrial countries as well as the flows for the United States and 
Germany individually. Therefore, one can conclude that the openness of  Ja- 
pan’s capital account, according to this measurement, rose rapidly during the 
1980s and maintains a very high level. 
5.4.2  Interest Rate Differentials 
Uncovered as well as covered interest rate differentials have been used as 
indicators of the extent of capital mobility. The uncovered interest rate differ- 
entials, if any, will reflect the exchange risk premium andor country risk, while 
the covered interest rate differentials reflect only country risks such as transac- 
tion costs, capital controls, taxes, and default risks, since the covered differen- 
tials are free of exchange risk by definition. Therefore, one can not definitely 
know where uncovered interest rate differentials come from, since those differ- 
entials could be due to exchange risks, country risks including capital controls, 
or both. In this sense, covered interest rate differentials could be a better indica- 
tor of whether and how strongly capital flows are ~ontrolled.~ 
However, for the case of Korea and Taiwan without forward currency mar- 
kets, only the uncovered interest rate differential can be examined, and it is 
given as follows: 
(1)  UD, =  R, -  R{-  ER,, 
where UD,  represents the uncovered interest differential, R, and R{  are the do- 
mestic and foreign interest rates measured by  the LIBOR-on-dollar deposit, 
2. The high percentage of portfolio investment in 1985 seems to reflect the effects of the once- 
and-for-all nature of  such capital decontrol measures as the establishment of the Korea Fund for 
nonresidents in  1984 and the permission for domestic firms to issue convertible bonds and bonds 
with subscription warrants or stock depository receipts in  1985. (See app. B for these changes). 
3. A lengthy and informative discussion of the usefulness of various concepts of interest rate 
differentials in quantifying capital mobility can he found in Frankel (1989). Also see It0 (1986) 
for discussions of the usefulness of  covered differentials as an  indicator of the degree of capital 
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Table 5.5  Uncovered Interest Rate Differentials for Korea, Taiwan, and Japan 
(annualized quarterly average; %) 









































Covered interest rate differential 
and ER, is the expected exchange rate depreciation measured by  the actual 
depreciation rate under the assumption of perfect foresight. On the other hand, 
for Japan with a well-developed forward yen market, the covered interest rate 
differential is examined and is defined as follows: 
CD, =  R, -  R!  -  fd,, 
where CD,  and fd,  represent the covered interest rate differential and forward 
discount on the yen, respectively, and other variables are the same as in equa- 
tion (1). However, CD, is actually measured by utilizing the LIBOR-on-yen 
deposit as a substitute for R{  +  fd, as the covered interest parity rate in equation 
(2).4  These data on interest rate differentials are reported in table 5.5 as annual 
averages and depicted quarterly in figures 5.1,5.2, and 5.3, for Korea, Taiwan, 
and Japan, respectively. 
For Korea, as illustrated in figure 5.1, the uncovered interest rate differential 
in the first half of the 1980s was, on average, slightly negative, while in the 
second half of the 1980s, it was highly positive. Korea faced outflow pressure 
in the early 1980s, while it faced strong inflow pressure in the second half of 
the 1980s. In Taiwan, as illustrated in figure 5.2, the pattern of uncovered rate 
differential was very similar to but more volatile than Korea’s. But, on average, 
Taiwan’s differentials are lower than Korea’s, especially for the latter half of 
the 1980s.  For Japan in figure 5.3,  the covered interest rate differential was very 
close to zero, denoting almost a full degree of capital mobility. This finding is 
very similar to what It0 (1986) found by  analyzing many different forms of 
covered interest rate differentials, among which the current form was also ana- 
4. One can, instead, use the data on forward discount rate on the yen actually observed in  the 
forward market as fd,  and the data on R{  and calculate R{  +  fd!  as the  covered interest parity rate. 
However, this method is destined to produce larger measurement errors than the method used in 
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lyzed, though he covered the period from the  1970s to the first half of the 
1980s.  He concluded that Japan’s capital controls were almost all lifted in 1980, 
and the covered interest rate parity was almost perfectly held since then. Ac- 
cording to these results, one may conclude that the highest mobility of capital 
is observed in Japan, while Korea and Taiwan maintain a reasonable, but lower, 
degree of capital mobility. 
5.4.3  Linkages between Domestic and International Interest Rates 
Recently, Reisen and Ykches (1991) applied Haque and Montiel’s (1990) 
extended version of Edwards and Khan’s (1985) model to Korea and Taiwan 
and showed an empirical measurement of capital account openness for those 
countries. In this subsection, Reisen and Ykches’s approach is applied to Ko- 
rea, Taiwan, and Japan. However, for Korea and Taiwan, the data utilized here 
for money stocks and interest rates are different from those used by Reisen and 
Ykches (see app. A for the list and sources of variables used in this ~ection).~ 
First, a constant measure of capital account openness is derived, estimating 
the following equation: 
(3)  R, -  R: =  (Y  + tJJ (Rr* -  R,‘), 0 5  tJJ 51, 
where R, is the domestic nominal market interest rate and R,* is the uncovered 
(covered) interest parity rate defined as international market interest rate plus 
expected exchange rate depreciation (forward discount rate). Using notation 
from equations (1) and (2),  R: can be written as follows: R,* =  RT+  ER, for the 
uncovered parity rate, and Rr* =  R:  +  fd,  for the covered parity rate. R: is defined 
as the domestic nominal market interest rate that would be observed if  the 
private capital account were completely closed and is derived as follows.6 
5. The broader concept of money (M,)  is used here instead of the narrow concept (M,)  used by 
Reisen and Yeches, and the yield to corporate bond for Korea and discount rate for Taiwan are 
used here as the market interest rate, while they used the curb market rate for Korea and the curb 
market rate and interbank rate for Taiwan. For Korea, Reisen and Ykches preferred the curb market 
rate, which is relatively inaccurately measured, to the bond yield because they thought the bond 
yield-especially  the government bond yield in the primary market-was  regulated.  However, 
the yield to corporate bonds in the secondary market was pretty much liberalized during the 1980s 
and so is picked  up as an  opportunity cost for money holding as well as the market rate. For 
Taiwan, the discount rate by the central bank was the only available data. In addition, we tried a 
different measurement for the uncovered interest parity rate by  utilizing an univariate ARIMA 
model for exchange rate forecasting, as will be seen later, in addition to the actual depreciation 
rate used by Reisen and Yeches for the expected depreciation rate. 
6.  Equation (3) is derived from Edwards and Khan’s (1985) argument that a domestic market- 
clearing interest rate can be expressed in general as a weighted average of foreign interest rate, 
i.e., interest rate in a fully open economy, and a domestic interest rate in a completely closed 
economy, with the weight given to the foreign interest rate being interpreted as the extent of capital 
mobility: in our notation, “Rt =  $RT  + (1 -  $) R,”’ where + measures the extent of capital mobil- 
ity. Then, Haque and Montiel (1990) transformed this form into “R, -  R,’  = $(R,* -  R,’,’’ and 
Reisen and Yeches (1 991) added a constant tern, a,  to this, as in equation (3) in the text, with the 
constant term being interpreted as reflecting the interest differential due to the difference in asset 
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As a first step, a domestic money demand function is estimated in the fol- 
lowing simple standard form: 
(4)  ln(M/P), = a. + a1  In y, + a2R, + a31n(M/P), -,  + E,, 
where M,, P,, and y,  are money stock, price level, and real GNP, respectively. 
Then, estimated equation (4) is solved for R,, and we introduce M:  = M, - 
CAP,, where CAP, is private capital movements, as follows: 
(5  )  R: = (a&J -  (al/aJ  In y, -  (a31aJ  In (M/P),-, 
+ (l/a2)  In  (M'/Q 
Now, estimated equation (3) will give + as the degree of influence of uncov- 
ered or covered interest parity rate on the domestic interest rate, which is to be 
interpreted as the openness of the capital account. 
In addition, for the case of the uncovered parity rate, we measured R,'  in two 
different ways alternatively by proxying the expected exchange rate deprecia- 
tion with the actual depreciation rate under the assumption of perfect foresight 
(case A) and by forecasting the expected depreciation rate with an univariate 
ARIMA (l,l,O) exchange rate forecasting model (case B)'  for Korea and Tai- 
wan, both of  which lack a forward currency market. On the other hand, for 
Japan, with a forward currency market, the LIBOR-on-yen deposit is used as 
R,*,  i.e., covered parity rate in this case, as in equation (2) in section 5.4.2. 
The estimated results of equations (3) and (4)  for Korea, Taiwan, and Japan 
are reported as follows. Equations (3a) and (3b) are the estimated results of 
equation (3) cases A and B of R: measurement, respectively. The t-values are 
in parentheses. The estimated +'s  for these countries are also summarized in 
table 5.6. 
Korea: Sample period, 1980:2-1990:4 
(34  R, -  R,'  = 4.371 + 0.889(Rr* -  R,'), 
(1.155) (22.014) 
R2 = 0.912, RHO1 = 0.759, D-W = 2.33. 
(7.237) 
7. Estimation results are as follows with E, denoting logarithm of exchange rate per dollar at 
time t and r-value in parentheses: 
Korea: Sample period, 1980: 1-1990:4 
E, -  E,-, -  0.584 
(4.716) 
-  E,-2), 
R2  -  0.959,  Q(18) = 7.295. 
Taiwan: Sample period,  1980:2-1990:4 
E, -  E,-, -  0.788 (E,-, - 
(8.290) 
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Table 5.6  Measurement of Capital Account Openness: Constant Measure 
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Haque and Montiel 
Haque and Montiel 
0.89  22.01 
0.85  22.23 
0.59  7.95 
0.92  17.31 
0.96  17.97 
0.35  10.20 
0.99  315.93 
0.87  8.54 










Sources: Reisen and Yeches (1991); Haque and Montiel (1990). 
(3b)  R, -  R:  = 5.038 + 0.845(R,*-Rrr), 
R2 = 0.921, D-W = 1.639. 
(5.310) (22.234) 
(4)  ln(M/P), = -0.29  + 0.086 In y, -  0.002 R, + 0.913 In 
(-2.12)  (3.44)  (-3.12)  (36.79) 
R2 = 0.996  h = -0.302. 
Taiwan: Sample period, 1981:2-1990:3 
(34  R, -  Rlr = 0.258 + 0.915(Rl*-R:), 
(0.072) (17.31) 
R2 = 0.91, RHOl = 0.727, D-W = 1.88. 
(6.279) 
(3b)  R, -  Rlr = -3.040  + 0.959 (Rt*-Rlr), 
R2 = 0.897, D-W = 1.567. 
ln(M/P), = 0.215 + 0.374 In y, -  0.022 R, + 0.763 In (M/P)l-l, 
(-2.815)  (17.974) 
(4) 
(6.84)  (2.36)  (-4.96)  (9.04) 
R’  = 0.99, RHOl = -0.25,  h = -0.324. 
(-2.01) 
Japan: Sample period, 1980:2-1990:2 
(3)  R, -  Rlr  =  -0.348  + 0.993 (R,*-Rrr), 
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8’  = 0.99, RHOl = 0.366, D-W = 1.46. 
(2.674) 
(4)  ln(M/P), = -2.195  + 0.272 In y, -  0.002 R,  + 0.848 In 
(-2.403)  (2.365)  (-1.382)  (12.213) 
R2 = 0.994, RHOl = -0.583,  h = 0.143. 
(-4.268) 
If  the estimated $ value from this model turns out to be large, it will be 
interpreted as implying a high degree of capital account openness. From these 
results (also see table 5.6), it becomes clear that Korea and Taiwan, both, have 
relatively high levels of  openness. Korea’s IJJ value is 0.889 for case A and 
0.845 for case B, both significantly different from 1. Taiwan’s IJJ value is 0.915 
for case A and 0.959 for case B, which are, however, not all significantly differ- 
ent from  1. These estimates of  IJJ for Korea and Taiwan are all higher than 
Reisen and Yeches’s estimates of 0.594 and 0.353, respectively. Japan’s IJJ value 
is 0.993, implying almost perfectly mobile capital flows, which is, however, 
significantly different from a value of  1.8 According to these results, Korea 
seems to be maintaining a reasonably high openness of capital flows, but to a 
degree lower than Japan and Taiwan. 
On the other hand, the constant term in equation (3) is interpreted as the 
difference in interest rates due to the difference in asset quality between do- 
mestic and international financial assets, but the results are diversified, de- 
pending on the different measurement methods of expected exchange depreci- 
ation: case A (eqq. [3a]) implies insignificant constant terms, but case B (eqq. 
[3b]) offers significant terms, both for Korea and Taiwan, even if  identical 
interest rate data are utilized, i.e., asset qualities are not changed for the two 
cases. For Japan, the constant term turns out to be significant. These results 
seem to contradict expectations since London interbank yen deposits and Ja- 
pan’s  domestic interbank deposits should be more identical in terms of asset 
quality than London interbank dollar deposits and Korea’s corporate bonds or 
Taiwan’s discount lending. Therefore, one must be careful in interpreting the 
constant term as a measurement of difference in asset quality. 
Second, the Kalman filter technique is applied to equation (3), and the time- 
varying estimates of  $ are derived for the three countries and are plotted in 
figures 5.4-5.6.9 To check if  the time variation of  IJJ is significant, i.e., that 
8. The estimation result of Japan’s money demand equation (4)  suggests that interest rate elasticity 
is relatively less precisely estimated and this may cause larger errors-in-variables problems with 
the estimated R:, which could in  turn produce a downward bias of the estimated  jr.  However, 
Japan’s estimated jr value seems high enough, and the precision of the estimate is fairly high with 
a r-value of 315.9. On the other hand, the result that Taiwan’s @ is not significantly different from 
1, but that Japan’s  @ is, seems inconsistent with the implication of other observations that Japan’s 
openness seems to be higher than Taiwan’s, as already seen concerning the degree of capital mobil- 
ity of  these countries. This stems from the fact that the estimate of Taiwan’s  jr is least precise 
among the three countries. 
9. See Reisen and Yeches (1991) for the details of this procedure applied specifically to equa- 
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filter, case A; B, Kalman filter, case B) 
Korea’s time-varying estimate of capital account openness (A, Kalman 
time-varying estimates of + are statistically different from constant estimates 
of  I),  we also draw the 99 percent confidence interval of the constant estimate. 
If the time-varying estimate falls outside of this interval, it is significantly dif- 
ferent from the constant estimate, and vice versa. First, for case A, Korea’s 
openness has gradually increased from the early 1980s but with a little stagna- 
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turns out to be significant, implying that Korea achieved a statistically signifi- 
cant improvement in capital account openness. This finding is opposite to the 
findings of  Reisen and Yeches. Their results imply that, in general, Korea’s 
openness gradually declined from the first half to the second half of the 1980s. 
Taiwan’s openness, after staying at low levels until 1986, increased sharply to 
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Fig. 5.6  Japan’s time-varying estimate of capital account openness (Kalman 
filter) 
then on, and this variation seems significant but much less than for the case of 
Korea. Second, for case B, Korea’s  openness has been gradually increasing 
and the variation is still significant; Taiwan’s  openness has been fluctuating 
around a relatively high level but within a narrow band, and so the variation 
turns out to be mostly insignificant. For Japan, time-varying estimates of  I), 
after a short drop in the first quarter of  1981, have been rising continuously, 
and these changes turn out to be significant, with time-varying estimates of I) 
being significantly different from constant estimates. 
Finally, to obtain an additional series of  time-varying  estimates for I), a 
rolling-over regression is applied to equation (3) by adding one more data point 
at each time, starting from the base regression which utilizes the first 10 data 
points from the data set used for the estimation of equation (3). The resulting 
time-varying estimates of  I) are plotted in figures 5.7-5.9  for each country. 
However, in this case, only case A is reported for Korea and Taiwan. According 
to this result, Korea displays almost the same trend (illustrated in fig. 5.7) as 
in the Kalman filter method. In figure 5.8, Taiwan also displays a trend similar 
to the result of  the Kalman filter method. After a sharp rise in openness in 
the mid-l980s,  there was  a trend  of  gradual decrease in the latter part of 
the 1980~.~O  Japan, in figure 5.9, also shows a trend similar to the result of the 
Kalman filter estimates. 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that Korea has achieved a 
reasonably high degree of openness, measured by constant estimates. The Kal- 
10. Case B both for Korea and Taiwan, not reported here, shows a pattern similar to case A, i.e., 
that rolling-over regression produces a trend very similar to the Kalman filter method. 152  Sung Hee Jwa 
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Fig. 5.7  Korea’s time-varying estimate of capital account openness (rolling- 
over, case A) 
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Fig. 5.8  Taiwan’s time-varying estimate of capital account openness (rolling- 








Fig. 5.9  Japan's time-varying estimate of capital account openness (rolling- 
over) 
man filter and the rolling regression show a steady increase in the level of 
openness during the 1980s, and this increase turns out to be statistically sig- 
nificant. However, it is also interesting to note that time-varying estimates for 
case A and rolling-over regression both show a relative stagnation of openness 
during 1987-88,  a period which coincides with favorable uncovered interest 
rate differentials and the rising importance of  capital flow  as percentage of 
trade as observed in table 5.2. Again, we find some inconsistency among the 
implications of  various measurements of  openness during  1987-88,  and it 
seems still to be the case that the capital control policy of leaning against the 
wind might have created this situation, as discussed in section 5.2.2. Note that 
time-varying estimates of + in equation (3) crucially depend on and tend to 
reflect the trend of the data on the uncovered interest parity rate (R:) which are 
the same data used for the calculation of uncovered interest rate differentials. 
Therefore, we come to the same situation as in section 5.2.2, where measure- 
ments related to uncovered rate  differentials suggest a slight stagnation of 
openness but capital flow as percentage of trade suggests the opposite.'' How- 
ever, after this short interval, the extent of openness seems to have returned to 
its rising trend. 
11. This seems to suggest that the time-varying JI in equation (3)  tends to reflect mainly informa- 
tion contained in the data on (un)covered interest rate differentials. In other words, the parameter 
+ mirrors mainly the image of  (un)covered differentials and, therefore, is somewhat limited in 
providing additional information on the openness of capital flow. The relationships between the 
movements of + and (un)covered differentials observed for the cases of Japan and Taiwan also 
lead to the same implication. 154  Sung Hee Jwa 
On the other hand, Taiwan experienced a sharp increase in openness around 
1986, then the trend seems to have declined slightly in the late  1980s, but 
according to case B, Taiwan’s openness turns out to be highly fluctuating even 
within a narrow band. However, the time variation of openness is not statisti- 
cally significant, implying that during the 1980s, Taiwan’s openness, even if 
reasonably high, remained stable. In the case of  Japan, the openness of  the 
capital account is not only very high but increased during the 1980s, and these 
changes turn out to be statistically significant. 
5.4.4  A Gross Flow Index for Capital Flow 
Trading in risky assets contributes to portfolio diversification and leads to a 
reduction of risk for the overall portfolio. There are gains to be achieved from 
trading in international financial assets if the prices for bearing certain risks 
differ for different countries. That is to say, the price differences among finan- 
cial assets of similar risk for different countries can yield trade gains, as in the 
international trade of commodities. 
“Bringing in the element of  risk is thus a major shift from the traditional 
analysis of capital flows, because it delinks the welfare implications of an open 
capital account from its effect on investment. Even if  saving and investment 
are unaffected by allowing capital flows, i.e., even if the private capital account 
were exactly balanced by inflow and outflows of capital, the individual agents 
of the economy would benefit from trade in risky assets. Moreover, the argu- 
ment that individuals should be allowed to trade assets internationally, based 
on differences in  preferences, production and evaluation of  risk, is, analo- 
gously to the trading of commodities, perhaps the strongest argument for open 
capital markets” (Hanson 1992). 
Suppose there could be two types of capital flows as implied in the discus- 
sion above: one is a capital flow traditionally perceived to supplement excess 
savings or investment, and the other exists to take advantage of  gains from 
trade in risky assets. To put the discussion in a simple context, if capital flow 
is assumed to consist of  only the former type, there is no need for two-way 
trade in capital. Deficient savings compared to investment will require only 
one-way capital inflow, while excess saving over investment requires only capi- 
tal outflow. However, once the second type of capital flow is added, the total 
volume of capital inflow and outflow will tend to increase for a given net flow 
that will eventually reflect excess savings or investment. Therefore, a relatively 
larger volume of  two-way capital flow, ceteris paribus, could be taken as evi- 
dence that capital flow of the second type is more active than otherwise. 
Along this line of  reasoning, we  introduce the concept of  the gross flow 
index for capital flow to measure the degree of  capital mobility of  this two- 
way  nature. This index measures the importance of two-way trade in capital 
flow  similarly to the  so-called intraindustry trade index and  is defined  as 
follows: 
I  net capital balance 1  _______~~ 
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If  the index is close to 1, the volume of total capital flow in both directions is 
very  large compared to the net balance required for savings and investment 
equalization. In this case, we interpret it as saying that capital flow reflects 
relatively more of the incentive to trade in risky assets. The capital account is 
more than the simple mirror image of the current account in this situation. If, 
on the other hand, the index is close to 0, indicating a more one-way flow, 
capital flow mirrors the current account to a relatively large extent, supple- 
menting deficient domestic savings for investment or encouraging the invest- 
ment of excess savings abroad.12 
These gross flow  indices for overall capital account, portfolio and direct 
investment, and other flows for various countries are reported in table 5.7. Ac- 
cording to this index, Korea is performing poorly for overall capital and portfo- 
lio investment flows, much lower than the Asian (developing) countries’ total. 
But the index shows that Korea has a very high degree of gross flow for foreign 
direct investment, much higher than the Asian total. However, it is interesting 
to observe that Japan’s indices for all forms of capital flow are lower than the 
industrial countries’ total (recall that Japan’s capital flows as a percentage of 
trade were in all cases higher than the total; table 5.4). In particular, Japan’s 
index for foreign direct investment is much lower than Korea’s. 
In  sum, the openness of  Korea’s capital flows appears low, whether mea- 
sured as the importance of capital account in foreign transactions, as in table 
5.4, or as intraindustry trade in capital flows. However, the intraindustry trade 
index, especially for foreign direct investment, is higher vis-A-vis  the Asian 
total than is flow as a percentage of trade. And the trade index, even the one 
for portfolio investment, rises over time, contrary to the case of the percentage 
of  trade. Therefore, one may  conclude that the openness of  Korea’s capital 
account is rising and registers higher on the intraindustry trade index than on 
capital flow as a percentage of trade. 
However, in the case of  Japan, one can see the reverse: the intraindustry 
trade indices for portfolio and foreign direct investments declined during the 
1980s and were much lower than that of  industrial countries’ total, while the 
opposite trend is observed for capital flows as a percentage of trade, as seen in 
table 5.4. This implies that even if  Japan shows a relatively large volume of 
total capital flow in foreign transactions, the nature of the capital flow is more 
counteractive, in response to current account surpluses, and less capital flow 
for its own sake, independent of the current account trend. According to this 
interpretation, Japan’s openness of capital flow, very high by  almost all mea- 
sures, seems to be rather limited. 
5.4.5  Evaluation 
One may conclude from this section that Korea’s capital mobility rose grad- 
ually during the 1980s and remains reasonably high, comparable to Taiwan’s 
12. Gros (1992) also used this index for measuring the effectivenss of capital control in  EC 
countries, but  without fully recognizing the importance of this index as a measurement of capital 
mobility that reflects trade in risky assets. Table 5.7  Gross Flow Indices for Capital Flow 
Overall Capital Accounta  Portfolio Investment  Foreign Direct Investment  Other Long-term Capital  Other Short-term Capital 












0.87  0.89  0.88  0.92  0.97  0.94  0.89  0.85  0.87  0.09  0.59  0.34  0.90  0.90  0.90 
0.54  0.58  0.56  0.59  0.23  0.41  0.41  0.69  0.55  0.06  0.13  0.10  0.52  0.83  0.68 
0.43  0.56  0.50  0.67  0.44  0.56  0.13  0.04  0.08  0.11  0.14  0.13  0.82  0.79  0.81 
0.50  0.39  0.45  0.78  0.64  0.71  0.34  0.30  0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.35  0.40 
0.71  0.57  0.64  0.12  0.26  0.19  0.17  0.49  0.33  0.16  0.70  0.51  0.86  0.72  0.79 
0.38  0.29  0.34  0.00  0.17  0.09  0.54  0.53  0.54  0.55  0.33  0.44  0.18  0.23  0.20 
0.60  0.41  0.50  0.47  0.31  0.39  0.19  0.13  0.16  0.31  0.34  0.32  0.64  0.44  0.54 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Source: IMF, Balance of  Payments Statistics  Yearbook (Washington, D.C.). 
"A weighted average of individual indices of portfolio investment, foreign direct investment, and other long-term and short-term flows with the weight given by the relative 
size of each category of capital flow in the total capital flow. 
bSee table 5.4,  note a. 
5ee  table 5.4, note b. Data for Taiwan were not available. 157  Capital Mobility in Korea since the Early 1980s 
but markedly lower than Japan’s. While Taiwan has maintained a higher con- 
stant measure of capital mobility than Korea, this estimation is less precise, 
and time-varying measures show insignificant variations, implying that there 
has not been much improvement in Taiwan’s capital mobility during the 1980s. 
For Japan, even with its very high degree of capital mobility during the 1980s 
by almost all measures, the intraindustry trade index for capital flows suggest 
a relatively limited degree of  capital mobility when compared to other mea- 
sures, such as capital flow as a percentage of trade. 
5.5  Concluding Remarks 
It has been suggested that stable macroeconomic conditions with low infla- 
tion, interest rate deregulation, and a flexible exchange rate system are the pre- 
requisites to successful capital account liberalization. According to the optimal 
sequencing literature, these conditions should be satisfied before the capital 
account is opened to any substantial degree. 
Korea is now at the threshold of  stabilizing its domestic economy, which 
has been overheated since the late 1980s, and correcting its current account 
deficit. This is  still creating some concern about the possibility that  capi- 
tal inflow may add to inflationary pressure, further aggravating the domestic 
macroeconomic situation. As mentioned earlier, although official interest rate 
deregulation policy has been in effect, the pace of deregulation has not devel- 
oped well, instead becoming entangled with government interventions. The 
prospect for interest rate liberalization at the moment seems very gloomy. On 
the other hand, the exchange rate regime is very much liberalized and moving 
in the right direction. 
Because of some of the impediments that still exist in Korea, it may be the 
case that rapid capital account liberalization is premature at this point. How- 
ever, now the government as well as the private sector has recognized the need 
and the inevitability of opening the capital account sector. The business sector 
in Korea has been eager to expand its access to foreign credit, beGause  the 
domestic supply of credit is tightly controlled. The government, for its part, is 
concerned about the effectiveness of  its monetary policy and is against too 
active an inflow of capital initiated by the private sector, though it faces strong 
U.S. pressure to decontrol capital flow. The U.S. government has been one of 
the crucial factors in determining the speed of Korea’s capital account opening. 
The United States is pressing the Korean government very hard to open its 
capital account to allow more freedom to U.S. banks, financial institutions, and 
businesses that want to invest in Korea. This international pressure will play 
an integral factor in determining the pace of capital liberalization. 
The Korean government, despite the real possibility of rendering domestic 
monetary policy ineffective, is seriously debating opening the capital account 
to realize the potentials of free capital movement in the longer policy horizon. 
Now, the government is preparing a long-term, gradual plan for capital account 158  Sung Hee Jwa 
liberali~ationl~  and has already enacted a new Exchange Control Law that in- 
stitutes the negative list system, a great improvement on the old positive list 
system. 
In sum, one can safely say that Korea fares relatively well compared to Japan 
and Taiwan in terms of international capital mobility. Korea’s absolute level of 
openness is still not very high, but it seems to be moving, even if a little slowly, 
toward liberalization and institutional and regulatory improvement. 
Appendix A 
Table 5A.l  Glossary of Variables Used and Their Sources 
Variable  Definition and Measurement  Sources 
M,  Money stock (period average): M,  1 
p,  Price level (period average): consumer price  1 
Y,  Real output: constant GNP  1 
CAP,  Private capital account: direct investment plus  1 
R,  Money market rate: yield to corporate bonds for  1 
R,’  Domestic market-clearing interest rate that  1 
index 
portfolio investment plus other capital, plus net 
errors and omissions 
Korea, discount rate for Taiwan, and short-term 
interbank rate for Japan 
would be observed if private capital account 
were completely closed 
R,*  Uncovered interest parity rate  1,2,3 
Case A for Korea and Taiwan: LIBOR on 
3-month dollar deposits plus actual 
exchange depreciation rate 
Case B for Korea and Taiwan: LIBOR on 
3-month dollar deposit plus expected 
exchange depreciation rate forecasted by 
ARIMA (1.1,O) model 
1-2,  3 
Covered interest parity rate for Japan: LZBOR on  1 
3-month yen deposit in Euro-market. 
Data Sources: 
1. IMF, International Financial Statistics, (Washington, D.C.). 
2. Korea Development Institute data base (Seoul). 
3. Financial Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District (Taipei). 
13. In this context, Korea may learn many useful lessons from the gradualist approach to capital 
account liberalization taken by Japan, Denmark, and Finland. See OECD (1 990) for the experience 
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Appendix B 
Regulatory  Changes in  Controls on Capital Transac- 
tions during the 1980s. 
Direct Investment by Foreigners 
84.7.1  Regulation system transformed from a positive list system to a 
negative list system. 
Automatic  approval  system  for  foreign  direct  investment 
adopted for foreign investment in  manufacturing businesses 
with its share under 50 percent and the investment amount un- 
der $1 million dollars, unless tax exemption is applied. 
Responsibility of approval for direct investments subject to au- 
tomatic approval transferred from the Minister of  Finance to 
the Bank of Korea. 
The amount of  foreign direct investment subject to auto- 
matic approval raised from $1 to $3 million dollars. 
The amount of foreign direct investment subject to automatic 




approval raised from $3 to $100 million dollars. 
system. 







Investment trust companies approved to issue matching funds 
to foreigners. 
Transaction of domestic securities by foreign investment com- 
panies approved. Korea Fund established on July 1, 1984. 
Issuance of convertible bonds and bonds with subscription war- 
rants or stock depository receipts allowed for domestic firms. 
Korea Europe Fund established. 
Issuance of mixed form of  matching fund allowed for invest- 
ment trust companies. 
Portfolio investment in the domestic stock market allowed up 
to 3 percent of the outstanding shares by a single investor and 
10 percent of the outstanding shares by a single company. 
Direct Overseas Investment 
8 1.7.21  Evaluation Committee for Foreign Investment established in 
the Bank of Korea. 
Prerequisites relaxed for investors from 3 years to 1 year for the 
experience requirement, and the capital prerequisite relaxed. 
The withdrawal obligation for invested funds and prior approval 
system for foreign investment project plans abolished. 160  Sung Hee Jwa 
82.7.19 
83.12.21 








The approval procedure simplified for foreign investments: re- 
quirement of opinion references of the related authorities abol- 
ished in cases of investments less than $100,000 dollars. 
The required ownership ratio for joint ventures alleviated: the 
required share reduced from over 50 percent to less than 50 
percent when real management power can be secured. 
The limit for automatic profit reserve increased. 
Foreign investment prerequisite and evaluation criteria for for- 
eign investments approval enacted. 
Amount of invested money for evaluation by the Inquiry Com- 
mission for Foreign Investment Projects adjusted upward from 
$500,000 dollars to more than $1 million dollars. 
Participation in cooperative projects added to the foreign in- 
vestment category. 
A system introduced that substitutes authorization by  confir- 
mation only of the foreign investment requirements in cases of 
investments less than $200,000 dollars or an offer of technical 
service. 
The minimum amount subject to confirmation of  foreign in- 
vestment requirements increased from $200,000 to $500,000 
dollars. 
The  maximum  reserved  profit  of  overseas  corporations in- 
creased from less than $100,000 dollars to $500,000 dollars. 
Investors’ qualifications relaxed, and experience prerequisites 
abolished. 
A simple reporting system introduced for foreign investments 
of  less than $1 million dollars and foreign investments by  re- 
served profit of less than $1 million dollar. 
Categories of  investments subject to approval by  the Review 
Commission for Foreign Investment Projects reduced; the in- 
vestment amount adjusted upwards from $3 to $5 million dol- 
lars, and investment for real  estate and agriculture excluded 
from those categories. 
Export credit deleted from the foreign investment category. 
The limits for voluntary profit reservations abolished for over- 
seas local corporations and an overall reporting system intro- 
duced for additional investment by the profit reserves. 
Investment qualification prerequisite relaxed: investment ap- 
proval by main transaction banks abolished. 
The approval procedure simplified. 
Foreign investments of less than $1 million dollars by individu- 
The own-capital requirement removed from the investor quali- 
Foreign investments by debt-equity swap allowed. 
als liberalized. 






Providing technical service excluded from the foreign invest- 
Category of investment expanded for real estate investments. 
Regulation on types of preferred businesses in foreign invest- 
ment abolished. 
Export-Import Bank of  Korea allowed to accept the reporting 
for foreign investments when projects meet regulatory require- 
ment and are given financial support by the Bank. 
The category of investment subject to the simple reporting obli- 
gation expanded from less than $1 to $2 million dollars. 
The limit for foreign investments by individuals abolished. The 
previous limit was $1 million dollars. 
Gratification requirements for investment relaxed. The owner- 
ship share reduced from 50 percent to 20 percent for security 
investment, and the minimum interest rate requirement (above 
6-month Libor rate) abolished. 
ment category. 
The category of investment in foreign real estate expanded. 
Corporations: real estate related to businesses such as facili- 
ties for research or training institutes. 
Individuals: overseas acquisition of real estate for business 
operation and residential houses for workers who work at a 
foreign branch for a long time period. 
The screening criteria strengthened for the prospect of business 
for large investments or investments exceeding self-financed 
capital. 
Large-scale projects: project is larger than $50 million dol- 
lars with Korea’s  share larger than 50 percent or Korea’s 
share is larger than $30 million dollars. 
Projects exceeding own capital: the investment exceeds $5 
million dollars and is more than investor’s own capital. 
Overseas Portfolio Investment 
Investment in Foreign Currency Securities by Institutional Investors 
85.9.1  Regulations related to participation in underwriting groups for 
Underwriting securities: foreign currency bonds and stock 
depository receipts that are issued by  domestic corporation 
in foreign markets. 
Scope of underwriting: underwriting limits for each security 
company set to within 1 percent of the total amount of issu- 
ance or less than $1 million dollars. 
Selling method: sell in foreign countries. 
foreign currency securities enacted. 162  Sung Hee Jwa 
Financial funding for underwriting: the fund raised through 
selling securities in foreign countries. 
Regulations on investments in foreign currency securities by 
Regulation on investments in foreign currency securities by in- 
Category of investment institutions enlarged to include not 
only security companies but also investment trust companies 
and insurance companies. 
Limits for investment amount increased to $30 million dol- 
lars for security companies and $10 million dollars for in- 
surance companies and investment trust companies. 
Investment category expanded to include not only participa- 
tion in underwriting groups but also in purchasing foreign 
currency securities in secondary market, depositing foreign 
currencies, and purchasing certificates of foreign currency 
deposits issued by  financial institutions. 
Approval procedure overhauled to report to the Bank of Ko- 
rea only when participating in underwriting groups, but ap- 
provals not required in other cases. 
The limit for investment in foreign currency securities by insti- 
Security companies: $50 million dollars for securities com- 
panies which acquired the dealing license for international 
businesses; $30 million dollars for others. 
Investment trust companies: $30 million dollars for invest- 
ment trust companies dealing with international businesses; 
$10 million dollars for others. 
Insurance  companies:  $30  million  dollars  for  insurance 
companies exceeding $5 trillion won in total assets; $10 mil- 
lion dollars for others. 
87.9.1 
88.7.1 
domestic security companies relaxed. 
stitutional investors relaxed. 
90.3.2 
tutional investors extended. 
Acquisition of Main Office Stocks by Korean Employees Who Work for 
Domestic Branch Offices of Foreign Companies 
87.9.7 
88.3.25 
Acquisition of main office stocks by  Korean employees work- 
ing for branch offices or offices of foreign banks allowed. 
Regulations on acquiring main office stocks relaxed. Stock ac- 
quisition approved for Korean employees who work for foreign 
direct investment companies or domestic branches of  foreign 
companies in which stocks are allocated specially by the main 





Partial adjustment and relaxation of borrowing conditions. 
Borrowing conditions changed from repayment in equal in- 
stallments to repayment in installments. 
Integration of  final repayment  period  from  2  years,  2lh 
years, or under 3 years, starting on borrowing day to within 
3 years. 
Partial relaxation of borrowing conditions. 
Equal installment conditions abolished. 
Conditions on borrowing interest rates abolished. 
In the case of  bridge loan, repayment by  borrowing from 
the funds raised with the contract to issue foreign currency 
bonds allowed. 
The responsibility to review the application for bridge loan 






The category for local financing expanded to cases related to 
development of  real  estates by  overseas  local  construction 
company. 
The beneficiary of trade related local financing expanded from 
importers from Korea to importers from Korea and exporters 
to Korea. 
Specific purpose regulation system replaced by general purpose 
regulation system. 
Local financing for facility investment and mortgage loan al- 
lowed. 
Exemption limit from the procedure of prior approval expanded 
from less than $1 million to $5 million dollars. 
Limitation of local financing expanded for trade related financ- 
ing from 30 percent to 50 percent of annual exports. 
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COlllInent  Kazuo Ueda 
This paper provides a neat summary of  Korean capital controls in the 1980s 
and an interesting econometric analysis of the degree of openness of  Korean 
money and capital markets. In the following, I organize my comments from 
the perspective of a comparison between the Japanese and Korean experiences. 
I was struck by the similarity between the Japanese and Korean experiences 
with controls on cross-border capital flows. Korean capital controls have re- 
sponded significantly to balance of payments situations; the same thing hap- 
pened in Japan in the 1970s. A balance of payments deficit led to more restric- 
tions on capital controls, which were then relaxed as the deficit turned into 
a surplus. 
It may also be interesting to comment on the background of the liberaliza- 
tion of controls in Japan that took place in the early 1980s. First, huge budget 
deficits in the late 1970s created a need for developing the market for govern- 
ment bonds, which in turn led to the liberalization of the movements of many 
other interest rates-a  precondition for free international capital movements. 
Second, with the exception of brief periods following the two oil shocks in the 
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1970s, Japan was starting to record large structural current account surpluses, 
thus relieving the government of its concern about the effects of capital account 
opening on the balance of  payments. Third, there were pressures from the 
United States to open Japanese markets. These points may provide some inter- 
esting lessons for understanding the process of capital account liberalization 
in Korea. 
Jwa also refers to concerns about exchange rate appreciation and the loss of 
monetary control as impediments to liberalization. These concerns are obvi- 
ously the two sides of the same coin. If a country wants free capital movements 
and independent monetary policy, it needs a flexible exchange rate and must 
forget about exchange rate changes. Japan has moved to a flexible exchange 
rate since 1973 but has not abandoned exchange rate targets completely, for 
various reasons. Hence, there have been serious constraints on domestic mone- 
tary policy-one  good example being the excessive monetary expansion of the 
late 1980s and the resultant asset price inflation. 
I have  some reservations about the more technical aspects of  the paper. 
Looking at the ratio of net to gross capital flows as a measure of capital account 
openness is interesting. Japan is on the liberal side according to this standard. 
However, this is due to the presence of  regulations in the domestic market 
which have forced Japanese firms to raise funds in foreign markets. 
In another test of capital account openness, the estimation of equation (l), 
Jwa uses actual exchange rate changes in the R*  variable, which creates an 
errors-in-variables problem, biasing the coefficient estimate toward zero. In 
the same test, the difference between R and R'  depends on the size of private 
capital movements relative to money supply, This should be small for a country 
like Japan, which tends to make the coefficient on R'  close to zero. A more 
natural test, though difficult because of the unavailability of data, would be a 
comparison of Euro-market and domestic interest rates. 
COIllKlellt  Pochih Chen 
1. Part of  capital flow may hide in trade by reporting false prices and by  the 
practice of lead and lag. Therefore, in addition to the fact that the ratio of trade 
to GNP may differ from country to country, using the ratio of reported capital 
flow to trade as an indicator of capital mobility may induce significant mea- 
surement errors. 
2. Capital flow itself may be a factor affecting money demand, especially in 
a temporary equilibrium. When someone shifts his money from currency A to 
currency B in expectation of the future appreciation of currency B, he would 
keep the funds in the form of  money for a while and therefore increase his 
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demand for money in currency B. This is a demand for money similar to the 
speculative demand for money pointed out by Keynes. If  equation (2)  of this 
paper could include this factor the results would be even more convincing. 
3. Capital flow may be sterilized by  the monetary  authority. Capital flow 
may also influence the credit creation ability of domestic financial institutions. 
Therefore, the effect of capital flow on money supply may not be as simple as 
the relation M' =  M -  CAP used in this paper. 
4. Under a floating exchange rate system, money supply will not be affected 
by capital flow directly. Its indirect effects through exchange rate variations 
would be very different from what is assumed in this paper. 
5. From an econometric point of  view, there would be a notable problem 
caused by measurement error in Rt',  As pointed out above, the method to esti- 
mate R,'  is not very delicate, so there would be significant measurement error 
in Rr'.  Because R,' appears on both sides of equation (l),  the estimated value 
of the coefficient of (R,* -  Rt')  in equation (1) would have a tendency to come 
closer to one when the measurement error of R,' increases. This would explain 
some part of the unacceptable results of the estimations in section 5.4.3. 
6.  Using the intraindustry trade index to measure the degree of capital mo- 
bility induced by  the differences in the risk nature of financial  assets is an 
interesting method. However, if the time period for measuring this index is too 
long, it is possible that there are significant changes in the economic situation 
so that the relative magnitude of capital inflow and outflow would change dras- 
tically within a single period. The direction of net flow may also change. In an 
extreme case, we may have only capital inflow in one part of  the period and 
only capital outflow in another part. Consequently, intertemporal trade within 
a period would be misregarded as intraindustry trade, if the length of the period 
for measuring this index is too long. 